Matching two or more users with related interests is an important and general primitive, applicable to a wide range of scenarios including job hunting, friend finding, and dating services. Existing on-line matching services requires participants to trust a third party server with their preferences. This raises security and privacy issues. In this paper, we tackle this problem by introducing two privacypreserving protocols: server-led matching and user-led matching. In the first protocol, potential matching pairs (e.g., users, companies) are selected by the server, which collects and combines each party's preference. In the second, entities are allowed to express their preference for any party-regardless of whether the other party is known to the server. With server-led matching, users reveal no information to the server; the server's role is simply to relay messages. In user-led matching, the server only learns which users match. Our protocols are scalable, i.e., preferences can be matched in constant time. We formally define security and functionality requirements for generic server-led and user-led matching protocols, and provide security proofs for our instantiations within this framework.
INTRODUCTION
User matching is the process by which two parties, say Alice and Bob, express their mutual interest by issuing commitments to each other. Matching parties with related interests is an important and general primitive, applicable to a wide range of scenarios including job hunting, friend finding, dating services, and on-line bidding. In broad terms, there exist two types of user matching: one where the server is in charge of selecting two parties (Alice and Bob), who then indicate whether there is mutual interest (i.e., they issue yes or no commitments); and another where users independently select a party they are interested in, and issue a commitment for that party. We refer to the two types as server-led matching and user-led matching respectively.
In a non-cryptographic setting, these functionalities are usually achieved by relying on a trusted server that acts as an intermediary between the Alice and Bob (e.g., [8, 12, 16, 20, 25] ). The server has full knowledge of the preferences expressed by all users, which causes considerable privacy issues: for server-led matchPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. WPES'15, October 12, 2015, Denver, Colorado, USA. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. ACM 978-1-4503-3820-2/15/10 ...$15.00. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2808138.2808148 ing, the server can leak (either intentionally, or accidentally) users' interests-or lack thereof; for user-led matching, the server can leak un-matched commitments, with possibly professional and social repercussions for the users. The goal of privacy-preserving user matching is to implement server-led and user-led matching without revealing user preferences to the server, and possibly to the other user, unless the two users independently select each other. In this setting, the trusted server is replaced with a secure cryptographic protocol, run by Alice, Bob, and an untrusted server.
Our server-led protocol allows users to upload a public profile (e.g., a nickname and a picture, a set of skills, etc.) which the server then uses to find candidate pairs, for matching. When a pair (Alice, Bob) has been identified, the server sends Bob's profile to Alice and Alice's profile to Bob. The parties decide whether they want to commit to each other, and thus learn the outcome of the protocol, which is either (i) both users decided to commit; or (ii) at least one of the users decided not to commit. No additional information is revealed to the parties (e.g., if Alice does not commit to Bob, she does not learn if Bob committed to her). The matching server never learns the choice of either participant (i.e., whether their commitment was yes or no), so no information about the user's preferences is revealed.
In our user-led protocol, users discover each other outside of the matching system, e.g., by knowing each other in real life or through social media. Then, they register with the user-led matching server using a pseudonymous (e.g., their email address, or their Reddit user ID) in order to commit to each other. Alice issues a commitment to Bob that indicate her willingness to be matched with Bob, if and only if Bob also (independently) commits to Alice. With this protocol, un-matched commitments only reveal who issued them, and not who they are issued for.
There are a number of problems that are related to privacy-preserving matching, such as secret handshakes [3] , private set intersection [14] (and cardinality-only private set intersection [7] ), trust negotiation [4] , hidden credentials [17] , oblivious envelopes [19] , and policy-based encryption [1] . However, none of these tools can satisfactory address this problem. We elaborate on this in Section 2.
Contributions. We formalize the notions of privacy-preserving user-led and server-led matching. We then introduce two protocols which implement these functionalities. Our first protocol improves on existing work on secure user-led matching in terms of efficiency and simplicity. Our second protocol is, to our knowledge, the first to implement secure server-led matching. This is an important security primitive, because its non-private counterpart (i.e., a trusted server that performs this functionality) is widely used in services such as Tinder [25] , Hitch [16] , and Cuddlr [8] . Furthermore, Facebook [12] , Twitter [28] and Linked-In [20] offer user matching as part of their services.
Although our protocols are presented with two users, they naturally extend to any number of users; in the rest of the paper, Alice and Bob are two arbitrary users from the set of all users. Since existing social networks have millions (or even billions [13] ) of users, practical privacy-preserving matching protocols must be very efficient. For this reason, all functionalities of our protocols are designed to require constant (i.e., O(1)) computation on all parties. Moreover, our techniques do not require users who are not involved in a specific match to participate in the protocol.
Our protocols are formally proven secure in our framework. Unlike previous work [2, 21, 30] , we relax the requirement for anonymous communication channels. Removing this requirement rules out any direct communication between the two parties, since it would allow them to identify each other using artifacts of the underlying communication channel, such as IP addresses.
Organization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the most prominent problems related to privacypreserving matching, and discusses why they do not address it; the same section then discusses related work. Section 3 formally presents functionality and security properties of privacy-preserving matching. Protocol instantiations are introduced in Section 4, while their security analysis is addressed in Section 5. Section 6 presents extensions to our protocols. We conclude in Section 7.
RELATED WORK AND UNRELATED PROBLEMS
In this section, we review the most prominent related problems, and briefly discuss their relationship with privacy-preserving server-led and user-led matching. We follow this with a review of related work.
(Un-) Related Problems
As noted by Shin and Gligor in [24] , there are a variety of problems that are somewhat related to privacy-preserving user matching, and for which secure and efficient protocols are known. Direct application of secure protocols for these problems in our setting, however, is not satisfactory for either security or efficiency reasons.
Secret handshakes. Secret handshakes allow two mutually untrusted parties to securely determine if they belong to the same group [3, 5, 9, 27] . There are clearly similarities between privacypreserving matching and secret handshakes. However, protocols for secret handshake require either a shared secret between parties who belong to the same group, or the use of a certification authority. Neither is required in our server-led and user-led protocols. Our protocols are therefore suitable when the parties have no prior knowledge of each other.
Trust Negotiation. Clients can perform authentication without revealing the full extent of their credentials through trust negotiation protocols [4] . In principle, these protocols can be used to address privacy-preserving matching. However, analogously to PSI based instantiations, the resulting constructions will be inefficient, less secure and less practical.
Other Related Problems. Shin and Gligor in [23] mention several problems that are related to our setting, such as hidden credentials [17] , oblivious envelopes [19] and policy-based encryption [1] . However, as noted in [23] these techniques focus mainly on the privacy of entities' attributes rather than on users' identity. Using these tools to construct user-led matching, if Alice commits to Bob she would also reveal her identity to him. This clearly does not satisfy our privacy requirement.
Related Work
Private Matchmaking. Baldwin and Gramlich defined the problem of Anonymous Matching in [2] . The paper addresses a problem that roughly corresponds to our user-chosen scenario, albeit not very efficiently. The paper proposes that "jokers" add fake transactions to the communication channel to "hide" real transactions. Baldwin and Gramlich's protocol requires a third party M to do the matching, and yet another party that the users trust to issue keys. Users exchange keys via M , who does not learn the key but does learn that the users are communicating. Fake transactions are supposed to make it more difficult for the server to detect actual users. The protocol was found to be vulnerable to message replacement attack by Zhang and Needham [30] .
Meadows proposed an improvement [21] to the protocol by Baldwin and Gramlich. The protocol still requires a trusted third party which must be online when the users sign up for the system. The scenario presented in [21] consists of two representatives from two different companies that trust each other. Key exchange is handled between the companies, and focus is on immediate-rather then eventualcommunication. The protocol in [21] is based on DH and assumes the two parties each have a secret. The objective is to check if the two secrets are the same without revealing them to each other.
In 2008, and later in 2013 Shin and Gligor [23, 24] revisited the problem of match-making protocols and added resistance to offline guessing attacks and forward secrecy to the list of properties. Their protocol is based on secure password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE). Although they provide a viable technique for user-led matching, their approach requires anonymous channels and does not address server-led matching.
Xie and Hengartner investigated in 2011 the problem of finding matches that fulfill some criteria, such as having shared interests [29] . The work is done in the context of mobile social networking, and uses a variant of private set intersection to achieve its goals. Xie and Hengartner's protocol can be compared with our user-led matching protocol, though it is significantly less efficient. It is not clear whether it is possible to construct a server-led matching protocol using the technique in [29] , because there is no server involved in the protocol.
Private Set Intersection. Private set intersection (PSI) [14] allows two parties to determine which subset of elements appear in both their input sets, without revealing additional information. PSI can be used to construct secure privacy-preserving matching, albeit inefficiently (in the user-led case) or only with only honest-butcurious users (in the server-led case). Next, we briefly discuss how to use PSI to implement user-led and server-led privacy-preserving matching.
To implement user-led privacy-preserving matching, Alice commits to Bob, by adding element Alice, Bob to her set, where the two elements are sorted, e.g., using lexicographic order. All users then engage in a separate instance of PSI with each user in the system. The use of PSI looks more promising for server-led matching. However the resulting protocol, discussed next, is inefficient, and is secure only in presence of semi-honest users. The server asks Alice and Bob if they would like to match. If Alice wishes to match with Bob, she creates a set containing an agreed-upon public constant. Otherwise, her set contains one random value. Bob builds his set analogously. Then Alice and Bob engage in PSI, using the server to forward protocol messages in order to conceal their real identity, and learn if both their sets contain the public constant. Let Alice be the party that learns the protocol's output. A malicious Alice could commit to Bob, and then arbitrarily replace the protocol's output, hence learning Bob's commitment without necessarily committing to him. Furthermore, this approach requires multiple communication rounds between Alice and Bob.
Server-Assisted Private Set Intersection and Private Equality Test. Kamara et al. introduced server-assisted PSI (SAPSI) in [18] . With SAPSI, two or more clients agree on a shared secret key k, and independently compute a PRP (keyed with k) over the elements of their input sets. The result of the permutations is sent to the server, which computes the intersection of these values and returns it to the clients. Because k is not known to the server, and the server does not collude with any other party, the intersection (and nothing else) is disclosed exclusively to the clients. Although the protocol is very efficient (communication and computation complexity is linear in the sum of the number of elements in the clients' sets, and all operations can be implemented using symmetric cryptography), we argue that it is not suitable for implementing user-led and server-led privacy-preserving matching. When used for user-led matching, the protocol assumes that all users share a secret key k, while the server has no access to k. This is clearly not possible in practice. Kamara et al. also present a technique for implementing server-aided private equality test. Although their protocol can be used to implement server-led privacy-preserving matching, it requires a substantially larger exchange of messages between the parties than our approach (due to the dummies used in the protocol). Moreover, it involves several rounds of communication between the protocol participants. If the parties are not on-line at the same time, this can possibly lead to substantial delays in the execution of the protocol.
SERVER-LED AND USER-LED MATCHING
In this section we formally define the functionality and security of our server-led and user-led matching protocols. SystemSetup algorithm is part of both protocols, and generates the system parameters which are subsequently made publicly available to all parties. This step is performed only once.
Protocol Functionality
Server-Led Matching Protocol. A server-led matching protocol is defined by a tuple of efficient algorithms (SystemSetup, UserSetup, Challenge, Response, Verify, Commit, Combine, Open), described below, and combined in three phases: Registration, Query and Notify, illustrated in Figure 1 .
In the Registration phase, Alice generates a public-private pair of values using UserSetup. She then sends the public value to the server, which challenges her to prove that she knows the corresponding private value. During the Query phase, the server sends Bob's public parameter and description to Alice, who issues a commitment computed using the Commit algorithm, on input her decision, private parameter and Bob's public parameter. (In practice, the server would concurrently perform the Query phase with Alice and Bob.) Once the server receives both Alice and Bob's commitments, it combines them using the Combine algorithm. Finally, in the Notify phase, the server returns the combined commitment to the users, who learn the resulting decision after invoking the Open algorithm. SystemSetup, UserSetup, Commit, Combine and Open are formally defined next:
A server-led matching protocol involves the following efficient algorithms:
• SystemSetup: a probabilistic algorithm that, on input a security parameter 1 κ , outputs a public system parameter Φ.
• UserSetup: a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input Φ and outputs a secret parameter xA and a public parameter yA for Alice.
• Challenge: a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input yA, and outputs a challenge γ and a (secret) response v.
• Response: a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input γ and xA, and outputs a response σA.
• Verify: a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input σA and v, and outputs 1 iff the σA is a correct response.
• Commit: a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input Alice's decision dA ∈ {yes, no}, xA, Bob's public parameter yB, and outputs a commitment cA.
• Combine: a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input two commitments cA, cB and outputs a combined commitment cAB. If dA = dB = yes, then cAB is a yes commitment, otherwise cAB is a no commitment.
• Open: a deterministic algorithm that takes as input cA, xA, yB, and outputs yes if cAB is a yes commitment, and no otherwise.
User-Led Matching Protocol. A user-led matching protocol is defined by a tuple of efficient algorithms (SystemSetup, UserSetup, Challenge, Response, Verify, Commit, Match, Open). These algorithms are combined in four phases (Registration, Lookup, Commit and Check) as illustrated in Figure 2 . Similarly to the server-led matching protocol, during the Registration phase Alice generates a public-private pair of values using UserSetup. She then sends the public value yA to the server, which challenges her to prove knowledge of the private value xA. In the lookup phase, Alice requests the public parameter of a user of her choice-say, Bob. If Bob has registered, the server returns his public parameter yB.
Otherwise, it returns a properly distributed random value. During the Commit phase, Alice decides to commit to Bob. To do so, she computes a commitment cA using her own private value xA and the public value of Bob yB. The server stores cA together with Alice's identity. Finally, in the Check phase, Alice sends a "Check" message to the server, which computes the set of values M that Figure 1 : Server-led matching protocol. The protocol is composed of three phases, "Registration", "Query" and "Notify", each of which can be executed independently. The semantic relationship between the phases is illustrated in Figure 3 .
represents matching commitments for Alice. Alice uses the Open algorithm on M to determine which users, to whom she committed, also committed to her.
SystemSetup, UserSetup, Challenge, Response, Verify, Commit, Match and Open are presented in Definition 2. We indicate the set of all users with U, and the set of all commitments sent to the server as D.
DEFINITION 2. A user-led matching protocol consists of the following efficient algorithms:
• SystemSetup: a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 1 κ , and outputs a public system parameter Φ.
• Commit: a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input xA, Bob's public parameter yB, and outputs a commitment cAB • Match: a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the set of all commitments from Alice, defined as:
and a set of commitments issued by all users except for Alice:
where U = U \ {Alice}. This algorithm returns a set M = {wi | (cAi ∈ C) ∧ (cAj ∈ S) ∧ (i = j) ∧ (wi = f (cAi, cAj))} for some function f .
• Open: a deterministic algorithm that takes as input M, xA, {yi}, and outputs the set of users {i | wi ∈ M}.
Security Properties of Matching Protocols
Both server-led and user-led matching protocols require a registration phase during which Alice proves that she is the owner of the public key being registered. Therefore, all security definitions in which A acts as the server assume that all users have registered their public parameters with A.
Server-Led Matching. A secure server-led matching protocol must prevent the server from learning any information about the commitment issued by Alice and Bob, i.e., the server should learn neither the content of the individual commitments, nor the result of a match. To formally define this notion, we introduce an experiment where the server is allowed to provide Alice and Bob with two pairs of decisions (dA,0, dB,0) and (dA,1, dB,1) of its choice (e.g., (yes, no) and (no, no)). If the protocol reveals no information about the individual decisions, or about the resulting output, then the server cannot determine whether Alice and Bob selected (dA,0, dB,0) or (dA,1, dB,1) as their inputs. We formalize this notion as indistinguishability under chosen commitments attack (IND-CxA):
A participates in the server-led matching protocol as the server, and interacts with Alice and Bob (both honest users).
A is provided with the public parameters of the users via the registration phase which is run by Alice and Bob with A. 2. A selects two pairs of decisions (dA,0, dB,0) and (dA,1, dB,1), where d u,β ∈ {yes, no} (u ∈ {A, B} and β ∈ {0, 1}), and sends them to the honest users. Another important security property of a server-led matching protocol is the inability of Alice to learn information about Bob's decision when she issues a no commitment. (If Alice issues a yes commitment, she always learns Bob's decision.) This property is captured by negative commitment attack (IND-NCA) security:
A participates in the protocol as a user, and interacts with an honest server and an honest user (Bob). User-Led Matching. In a secure user-led matching protocol, the server must not be able to determine which user Alice has committed to, unless there already exists a corresponding commitment from that user to Alice. To represent this, we allow Alice to commit to one of two users U0 and U1, who did not commit to her, and challenge the adversary to determine who Alice committed to. This notion is captured by the server matching attack (IND-SMA) experiment.
Experiment IND-SMAA(κ)
1. A participates in the protocol as the server, and interacts with an honest user Alice. 2. A performs registration with Alice and two users, U0 and U1. 3. Alice is given two sets of public parameters, corresponding to U0 and U1. A secure user-led matching protocol must prevent a malicious user from forging commitments from a different user. This notion is captured by our forging commitment attack experiment (FCA), presented next. In our protocol instantiation (see Section 4), IND-SMA security implies FCA security. However in general this is not true.
Experiment FCAA(κ) 1. A participates in the user-led matching protocol as a user, and interacts with an honest server. 2. A performs the lookup protocol multiple times, obtaining public parameters of users U1, . . . , Uj as well as their corresponding secret information. 3. Eventually, A is given the public parameter of two new users UA and UB and outputs a value C. 4. The experiment outputs 1 if C is a valid commitment that binds UA and UB; otherwise it outputs 0.
DEFINITION 6 (FCA SECURITY).
A user-led matching protocol has unforgeable commitments under a forging commitment attack if there exists a negligible function negl such that for any PPT A, Pr[FCAA(κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ).
PROTOCOL INSTANTIATIONS
In this section we present our instantiation server-led and user-led matching.
Server-Led Matching Protocol
Our server-led matching protocol uses a collision-resistant hash function H(·) and a semantically secure additively homomorphic encryption scheme: Setup(·), Enc(·), Dec(·). In an additively homomorphic encryption scheme, Enc(m1) · Enc(m2) = Enc(m1 + m2), which also implies that Enc(m) a = Enc(a · m). (Public/private keypairs are generated using Setup(·), and it holds that Dec(Enc(m)) = m.) Additionally, our constructions require that the message space of the homomorphic encryption scheme used is a field. Any encryption scheme with the above properties, such as the Paillier [22] or DGK [10, 11] , suffices for the purposes of this work. Next, we introduce the instantiations of each algorithm in Definition 1:
• SystemSetup(1 κ ): Outputs Φ = (p, q, g), i.e., the description of a cyclic group G, a generator g of a subgroup of size q of G and prime p s.t. q|p − 1.
• UserSetup(Φ): Picks a random value xA ← Zq and sets yA = g x A . Then, it outputs (xA, yA).
• Challenge(yA): Picks a random value r ← Zq and sets v = (yA) r . Then, it outputs γ = (g r , H(v)).
, the algorithm aborts. Otherwise, it returns σ.
• Verify(σ, v): Returns 1 if σ = v, and 0 otherwise.
• Commit(dA, xA, yB):
. If dA = yes, then mA = 0; otherwise, mA is selected uniformly at random from the message space of Enc. The output is set to cA = Enc(mA).
• Combine(cA, cB): Selects a random element s from the message space and computes cAB = (cA · cB) s = Enc((mA + mB) · s). If mA = 0 and mB = 0, then cAB is the encryption of 0.
1 Otherwise, cAB corresponds to the encryption of a random element from the message space of Enc.
• Open(cAB): Computes (pk, sk) ← Setup(1 κ , r) where r = (yB)
x A = g x A x B and sets dAB = Dec(cAB). If dAB = 0, then it outputs yes; otherwise, it outputs no.
A possible execution of our server-led protocol is illustrated in Figure 3 . For clarity, we include both Alice and Bob. However, the protocol is independently executed by each user, and with no timing constraints on messages.
The purpose of the challenge/response/verify steps, executed during the registration phase, is to verify that the new user has knowledge of the secret key associated with the public parameter she is registering. In other words, these steps guarantee that the user is not registering somebody else's public parameter under her name. The steps also guarantee that the server does not learn any additional information that can only be computed using Alice's private key. This is also important for Alice, as it would otherwise be possible for the server to force Alice to produce a valid commitment for Bob by replacing g r with yB = g x B . However since the server does not know xB, it cannot compute H((g r ) x B ). A formal argument for the security of these steps is provided as proof of Theorem 5 in Appendix A. To simplify exposition, we omit treatment of the registration phase from the security proofs presented in Section 5.
User-Led Matching Protocol
In this Section we present our instantiation of user-led matching. Our protocol uses a secure pseudo-random function PRF k (·), keyed with Alice and Bob's shared secret, to generate their commitments. This allows us to generate additional keys, known only to Alice and Bob, as discussed below. The keys are used to securely exchange information between the users through the Server.
The registration phase of the user-led matching protocol is the same as in the server-led protocol. However for the sake of completeness we present the instantiation of all algorithms, including SystemSetup and the four algorithms used in the Registration phase: UserSetup, Challenge, Response, and Verify.
• SystemSetup(1 κ ): Outputs Φ = (p, q, g), i.e., the description of a cyclic group G, a generator g of a subgroup of size q of G and prime p s.t. q|p During the Registration phase, the server checks if Alice has knowledge of xA as discussed in the instantiation of the server-led matching protocol. The Check phase of the protocol will only return matches if Bob has also executed the protocol with the server, and has committed to Alice. Without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper we assume that Check is executed after each Commit, and that therefore the server only checks if the new commitment matches any existing commitment.
As an extension not show in Figure 4 , Alice can optionally compute k = PRF k A (1). k is then used to encrypt an additional message msgA as wA = E k (msgA) using a symmetric encryption scheme during the Commit phase. wA is then sent to the server along with cA. If Bob commits to Alice, the server returns wA to Bob (and possibly the corresponding wB to Alice) during the Check phase. Both Alice and Bob can decrypt wA and wB since they can reconstruct k from g x A x B .
Retrieving Public Parameter Privately. In our user-led matching protocol, Alice must retrieve Bob's public parameter before committing to him. Although knowing that Alice obtained Bob's public parameter does not prove that she will commit to him, this still represent information leakage. This problem can be mitigated if each new user could be provided with a complete list of all existing users after registering. This way, the server learns nothing. Although this 
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When cA and cB are received: might work for a small number of users (the keys and identifiers of 100,000 users occupy 20-30 MB), it does not scale to millions of users. Moreover, this discloses the complete list of users enrolled in the system, which in itself might be sensitive.
A more efficient approach is to use a private information retrieval (PIR) protocol [6] , which allows Alice to privately request arbitrary identities from the server. As an alternative, assuming that the volume of requests is sufficiently high, Alice can issue anonymous requests to the server via an anonymizing service such as Tor [26] .
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the correctness, efficiency and security of our server-led and user-led protocol instantiations. In our security analysis, we use the term adversary to refer to insiders, i.e., protocol participants. External adversaries are not considered, since their actions can be mitigated via standard network security techniques, i.e., confidential and authenticated channels. Our protocols are secure in the presence of malicious users and semi-honest (also known as honest-but-curious or passive) server. We refer the reader to [15] for the formal definitions of the malicious and semi-honest models. Although we continue our analysis of the server's behavior in the semi-honest model, it is important to note that if the server turns malicious, it can only break the functionality and fairness of the matchmaking protocol, not the privacy of the user's choices.
Our scheme requires the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme to be semantically secure. To formalize this notion, we use the standard IND-CPA security definition, reported next:
Adversary A is given pk and eventually outputs two messages m0, m1 of its choice. 
Server-Led Matching Protocol
Correctness. Alice and Bob independently run Commit on input (dA, xA, yB) and (dB, xB, yA) respectively. Since Setup is deterministic and its inputs (yB)
x A from Alice and (yA) x B from Bob are identical, the two users compute the same keypair (pk, sk). If both Alice and Bob issue a yes commitment, i.e., mA = mB = 0, then cAB = (cA · cB) s = Enc((0 + 0) · s) = Enc(0). On the other hand, if at least one of the participants issues a no commitment, cAB is the encryption of a random element in the message space of Enc.
Computational Complexity. The server can implement Registration in constant time by storing user information in a hash table. The cost of the Query and Notify phases is also constant. The space required for the server to run the protocols grows linearly with the number of users due to the cost of storing their public parameters and additional information. Both time and space complexity for users are constant. THEOREM 1. Assuming that the underlying homomorphic encryption scheme is semantically secure and that DDH holds in G, our server-led matching protocol is IND-CxA-secure against a semi-honest server.
PROOF. We show that an adversary A that has non-negligible advantage (which we indicate as δ(·)) over 1/2 to win the server matching privacy experiment can be used to break the semantic security of the homomorphic encryption scheme used to instantiate the protocol. Let SIMS be a simulator that interacts with the server as follows. SIMS plays the IND-CPA experiment and receives pk from the IND-CPA challenger. It generates two random values xA and xB and sends pk, g
x A and g x B to A. SIMS then receives (dA,0, dB,0) and (dA,1, dB,1) from A. It then sends chu = (mu,0, mu,1) to the IND-CPA challenger, where u ← {A, B} and m u,β = 0 if d u,β = 0, and m u,β is a random value otherwise. The IND-CPA challenger returns Enc pk (m u,b ). SIMS sends { (Enc pk (m u,b ), x), (Enc pk (mū ,b ),ū)} whereū ∈ {A, B} \ {u} (i.e., if u is A thenū is B, and vice-versa) and b is a random bit. A might abort because pk has not been generated using g u A and g u B as input of Setup. However, if this is the case, it is easy to see that this behavior can be used to break DDH in G as follows. Given a DDH challenge (g, g
and send pk, g x 1 and g x 2 to A. We have that, with non-negligible advantage over 1/2, x3 = x1 · x2 iff A aborts. Since this violates the assumption that DDH is hard in G, A cannot determine whether pk was generated using g x 1 and g x 2 .
Eventually A outputs b ; SIMS outputs the same value.
} is a proper challenge for A, and therefore b = b with probability 1/2 + δ(κ). Otherwise, the challenge reveals no information about b and therefore A can guess correctly with probability 1/2. Therefore, we have that b = b with probability 1/2 · (1/2 + δ(κ) + 1/2 · 1/2) = 1/2 + 1/2 · δ(κ). Since δ(·) is non-negligible, also 1/2 · δ(·) is non-negligible. This contradicts the semantic security of the homomorphic encryption scheme.
THEOREM 2. Our server-led matching protocol is IND-NCAsecure against a malicious server.
PROOF. After interacting with the honest server, A learns (y + m b ) · s. Since y + m b is not equal to zero and s is uniformly distributed in the message space, (y + m b ) · s does not reveal any information about m b .
User-Led Matching Protocol
Correctness. Alice commits to Bob by computing cA = PRF k A (0), while Bob commits to Alice with cB = PRF k B (0). We have that kA = (yB)
Computational Complexity. The protocol is efficient for both the server and the users. The server can implement Registration, Lookup and Commit in constant time, and Check in linear time in the number of commitments from Alice by storing user information and commitments in two separate hash tables. (In practice, the number of commitments issued by Alice is negligible compared to the number of users.) The space required for the server to run the protocols grows linearly with the number of users and the number of commitments issued by the users. Both time and space complexity for users are constant. THEOREM 3. Assuming that DDH holds in G, our user-led matching protocol is IND-SMA-secure against a semi-honest server.
PROOF. We show that a simulator SIMU can use A to break DDH in G as follows. Let (g, g x 1 , g x 2 , g x 3 ) be a DDH challenge, i.e., P [x3 = x1x2] = 1/2. SIMU sets the system's public parameter to Φ = (g, p, q), its public parameter to g x 1 , the public parameter of U β to g x 2 and the public parameter of U ¬β to a random element r ← G and its commitment to c = PRF g x 3 (0) (β is a random bit). Then, it sends (g, g x 1 , g x 2 , r, c) to A.
A might abort because if g x 3 = g x 1 x 2 , then c is not a legitimate commitment of SIMU with either U0 or U1. However, if this is the case, it is easy to see that this behavior can be used to break DDH in G, since A would abort if (g, g
is not a DDH tuple, and output b otherwise.
Eventually, A outputs its choice b . SIMU outputs 1 if b = β, and a ← {0, 1} otherwise. It is easy to see that when b = β, SIMU 's answer is correct iff A's answer is correct. Therefore, SIMU 's output is correct with probability 1/2 + 1/4. This violates the assumption that DDH is hard in G, and therefore A cannot exist. THEOREM 4. Assuming that DDH holds in G, our server-led matching protocol is FCA-secure against a malicious user.
PROOF. We show how a simulator SIM can interact with A to break DDH in G. SIM receives a DDH challenge (g, g x 1 , g x 2 , g x 3 ) and sets the system parameter to g, UA's public parameter to g A eventually outputs C = PRF (g x 1 x 2 ) (0). Because C is equal to PRF (g x 3 ) (0) with negligible probability if x3 = x1x2, we have that x3 = x1x2 with overwhelming probability. Therefore (g, g
is a DDH tuple with overwhelming probability if C = PRF (g x 3 ) (0). Since DDH is hard in G, A cannot output win the IND-CMA experiment with non-negligible probability.
PROTOCOL EXTENSIONS
In this section we present protocol extensions that have been left out of the explanation of the basic protocols for clarity.
Committing to Users and Keywords. In the user-led matching protocol, instead of simply committing to Bob, Alice may want to specify one or more keywords that must be matched by both users, thus only committing to Bob if he also commits to keyword kw. In this case, Alice generates her commitment as cA = g
where H(·) is a cryptographic hash function. Bob's commitment will match only if he also includes H(kw) as part of his commitment.
Information Transfer. Users of the server-led matching protocol might want to exchange additional information in case they both issue a positive commitment, without relying on additional communication via the server after executing the protocol. For example, if Alice and Bob's identifiers are nicknames not tied to any other on-line identity, they will need to exchange email addresses in order to communicate outside of the matching system. This can be done as follows. Alice encrypts her identifier idA using pk as eA = Enc pk (idB). Similarly, Bob computes eB. eA and eB are then sent to the server which, given two the two commitments cA and cB, sends (eA · (cA · cB) s ) = Enc(idA + s · (mA + mB)) to Bob for a random s . (Analogously, Enc(idB +(mA+mB)·s ) is sent to Alice.) If both users commit to each other, then (mA +mB)·s = 0 and therefore each party receives the other user's identifier. Otherwise, (mA + mB) · s is uniformly distributed in the message space, and therefore user do not learn the other party's identifier.
Security Extensions
Next, we discuss how to prevent attacks carried out by adversaries that are outside the adversary model considered thus far.
In both protocols a malicious server can claim that an honest user issued a commitment that she, in fact, did not generate. In the serverled matching protocol, after receiving a commitment from Alice, the server performs the matching computation with two copies of Alice's commitment, pretending that one of the copies came from Bob. (The server can correctly guess Bob's identity with low, albeit non-negligible, probability, given a commitment from Alice.) In the user-led protocol, the server can always return a false match. Analogously, after the server discloses a match to Alice and Bob, Bob might claim that he did not commit to Alice.
In other words, the protocols do allow the parties to prove their statements. However, the protocols can be easily modified to guarantee correctness by requiring users to sign their commitments using any public-key signature scheme. In case of a dispute, the server can reveal two commitments (one from Alice and one from Bob) with valid signatures if and only if it has faithfully followed the protocol.
In the server-led matching protocol, after the server reveals both signed commitments, Alice decrypts Bob's commitment to verify the server's claim. (Similarly, Bob can verify Alice's claim.)
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a formal framework for securely matching two or more parties with related interests. We looked at two different scenarios: privacy-preserving server-led matching, where a server selects potential matching pairs, then collects and combines each party's private preference; and privacy-preserving user-led matching, where entities are allowed to express their private preference for any party.
We presented secure and efficient instantiations of both functionalities. Security of our protocols is supported by formal proofs, based on standard assumptions. Users are modeled as malicious entities, while the server is semi-honest. We also presented several extensions that enable the protocols to function (partially) with a fully malicious server.
Our protocols are practical and efficient. The cost of commitment generation and matching is constant, i.e., it does not depend on the number of users. Moreover, the cryptographic operations performed in the protocols are relatively inexpensive and the protocols involve only a few short messages per phase.
